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Evisceration of the Right to Appeal:
Denial of Individual Responsibility as
Actionable Genocide Denial
Tensions arise during litigation in the international criminal justice
system between the practice of the international criminal tribunals, domestic
laws, and policy decisions of United Nation (“UN”) Member States. One such
tension arises between domestic genocide denial laws, which typically
criminalize denial of genocide as a strict liability offense, and the preservation
of due process for persons convicted of genocide seeking appeal. In theory,
denying individual responsibility during the appeal of a conviction by an
international tribunal could constitute punishable genocide denial under some
domestic laws. This criminalization of the appeal process would violate the due
process rights of international criminal defendants, sacrifice the review
mechanism ensuring fair trial rights in international criminal tribunals, and
affect the legitimacy of international criminal justice. This Note argues for an
interdisciplinary solution to combat genocide denial that fully respects due
process. First, domestic denial laws should be amended to include an intent
requirement to exclude from coverage denial of individual responsibility during
litigation. Second, all international and hybrid criminal tribunals should
implement safeguards to protect defense counsel and witnesses from domestic
prosecution for their role in the appeals process. Third, the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals should clarify its enduring
dedication to both reducing denialist behaviors and respecting due process and
should call on all states to do the same. Genocide denial is a harmful
phenomenon with no place in modern discourse; however, sacrificing full due
process rights in the international criminal tribunals does little to reduce the
effects of genocide denial.
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INTRODUCTION
Few would argue that an individual accused of a crime does not
have the right to stand before a judge and claim, “I am not guilty,”
regardless of the claim’s veracity. But what if, in an effort to achieve
respectable policy goals, courts decided that the mere act of saying the
words “I am not guilty” made one guilty? What if appealing a conviction
and claiming, “The trial court made a mistake, I am not guilty”
constituted a crime by virtue of its mere promulgation? These questions
are arising in the international criminal legal field as practitioners
explore the proper bounds of policies created to combat the denial of
genocide. Specifically, the international criminal defense bar is
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concerned about whether denial of an individual’s responsibility for
genocide after guilt has been adjudicated by an international criminal
tribunal qualifies as genocide denial and is thus actionable under
domestic denial laws.1
In the international criminal justice field, practitioners must
balance many objectives in the pursuit of achieving justice following the
atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.2
Those objectives include retribution, deterrence, and aiding postconflict
reconciliation.3 Pursuit of these objectives must also be marked by the
assurance of fair trial rights to defendants to preserve the legitimacy of
the international criminal justice process.4 Tensions can arise between
these varying objectives—here, a tension arises between efforts to
promote reconciliation by reducing genocide denial and international
criminal defendants’ right to an effective appeal.5
Public statements made by the President and Prosecutor of the
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (“IRMCT” or
“Mechanism”)6 in 2018 and 2019 linked genocide denial to the
glorification of convicted war criminals.7 Because the glorification of
1.
For purposes of this Note, the term “domestic law” refers not to the law of the United
States but to the laws promulgated by national governments in other countries around the world.
Specific attention will be paid to laws promulgated in European and African nations that have
criminalized genocide denial.
2.
See U.N. Off. on Genocide Prevention & the Resp. to Protect, Framework of Analysis for
Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, 1 (2014), https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/
documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.49_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes
_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8XH-7EFU] (identifying and defining genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes as “atrocity crimes”); see also International Justice, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/international-justice/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8TA5-7RH2] (providing definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes).
3.
ROBERT CRYER, HÅKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN
INTRODUCTION TO I NTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 17–35 (3d ed. 2014); Colleen
Murphy, Political Reconciliation and International Criminal Trials, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 224, 225 (Larry May & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2010).
4.
See S.C. Res. 1966, annex 1, arts. 19, 23 (Dec. 22, 2010) (stating the rights of the accused
and procedures for appeal).
5.
See infra Part IV.
6.
The United Nations Security Council (“Security Council”) established the IRMCT in 2010
“to carry out all residual functions of the” International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 4,
preamble. The IRMCT must ensure the rule of law, guard against impunity, and preserve due
process for defendants. See U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8681st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8681 (Dec.
11, 2019) (comments by Judge Agius, president of the IRMCT).
7.
See U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8681st mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8681 (Dec. 11, 2019)
(comments by Prosecutor Brammertz); Press Release, IRMCT Off. of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor
Serge Brammertz Addresses the United Nations Security Council (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.irmct.org/en/news/prosecutor-serge-brammertz-addresses-united-nations-securitycouncil-3 [https://perma.cc/GV44-XFTJ] [hereinafter Brammertz Address] (relaying comments by
Prosecutor Brammertz linking genocide denial to glorification of war criminals in Yugoslavia).
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international crimes is a criminal element of genocide denial in many
domestic statutory schemes, these statements could imply the
extension of criminal sanctions for genocide denial to encompass
criminal sanctions for denial of individual responsibility.8 If so, an
international criminal defendant could potentially subject himself and
his counsel to genocide denial charges merely by appealing a genocide
conviction. Furthermore, witnesses would be unlikely to assist with
appeals if genocide denial was interpreted to encompass assertions of a
defendant’s individual innocence following conviction for genocide.
Similarly, defense counsel would be unlikely to zealously advocate for
their clients due to fear of prosecution for denial.
This Note examines whether there is any basis in existing
international law or state practice for classifying individual denial of
responsibility as genocide denial9 and argues that even if such a basis
exists, characterizing a standard appeal as genocide denial would
impermissibly infringe on the defendant’s due process rights under both
international law and the domestic laws of various nation states.10
Although there is much debate and scholarship on the tension between
genocide denial laws and freedom of expression, there is little, if any,
discussion regarding the tension between genocide denial laws and the
fundamental due process rights of international criminal defendants.11
This Note aims to fill that void. Part I provides an overview of laws
regulating genocide denial at the domestic level, along with
international policies regarding genocide denial. Part II then outlines
the due process rights to which international criminal defendants are
entitled that could be affected by denial laws. Part III analyzes the ways
in which denial laws threaten due process rights during appeals in the
international tribunals. Ultimately, Part IV proposes an
interdisciplinary solution that ameliorates those threats while
countering genocide denial in a meaningful way. The holistic solution
will require the inclusion of a mens rea requirement in domestic denial
statutes, UN Security Council action, protective measures for defense
counsel and witnesses, and creative approaches to reducing denial
behaviors.

8.
GREGORY S. GORDON, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION, FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION
73–74, 160 (2017).
9.
In this Note, the term “State” refers to a nation-state.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See, e.g., Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Nov. 8, 1996) (concerning a professor who claimed a violation of his
right to freedom of opinion and doubt when he was fired from his post after stating that Jews were
not exterminated in the gas chambers at Auschwitz and other concentration camps).

2021]

EVISCERATION OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

225

I. GENOCIDE DENIAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
REGARDING THE ERADICATION OF GENOCIDE DENIAL
The current state of international and domestic law regarding
genocide denial creates the pssibiity that denial of individual
responsibility for genocide may be construed as genocide denial subject
to domestic criminal enforcement. First, this Part will provide an
overview of the frame and scope of domestic genocide denial laws. It will
then outline notable instances in which denial of individual
responsibility and denial of specific legal characterization of events
have served as a basis for genocide denial sanctions. Finally, it will
address public statements made by IRMCT representatives regarding
denial policy, which have generated concern about a sea change in
genocide denial litigation.
A. Genocide Denial
Numerous states have chosen to criminalize genocide denial
because of its potential to energize further genocidal acts and the
destructive effects denial behaviors have on communities and survivors
recovering from atrocity crimes.12 Denial—distortions of fact and
revisions of history—can revive painful memories for survivors and
their families, alter mental constructions of the events in question, and
besmirch the identity of a group victimized by genocide.13 Genocide
denial also surpasses manipulation or contradiction of historical fact by
recreating an environment that is hospitable to further victimization
and extreme suffering.14 Historian Deborah Lipstadt argues that
genocide denial serves as the front for “anti-Semitism, racism, [and]
prejudice parading as rational discourse.”15 Specifically, denial spawns
and affirms perpetual indifference, hostility, aggression, and

12. See Paul Behrens, Nicholas Terry & Olaf Jensen, Introduction, in HOLOCAUST AND
GENOCIDE DENIAL: A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Paul Behrens, Nicholas Terry & Olaf Jensen
eds., 2017) (noting the increasing importance of criminalization of genocide denial). Genocide
denial can create an environment in which genocide can recur. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess.,
5868th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5868 (Resumption 1) (Apr. 16, 2008) (“Genocide denial, as a last
stage of the implementation of the genocidal ideology, is a formidable threat to peace and security,
as it energizes perpetration.”).
13. Genevieve Parent, Genocide Denial: Perpetuating Victimization and the Cycle of Violence
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 10 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 38, 42 (2016).
14. Id. at 44.
15. TedxSkoll, Deborah Lipstadt: Behind the Lies of Holocaust Denial, TED, at 5:06 (Apr.
2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/deborah_lipstadt_behind_the_lies_of_holocaust_denial/readinglist?referrer=playlist-talks_to_help_you_become_a_better_researcher
[https://perma.cc/Z7SHBYG8].
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dehumanization.16 Interviews with those affected by denial suggest that
at the individual level, denial causes victims to experience irritability,
frustration, anger, depressive symptoms, anxiety, and survivor’s guilt.17
One interviewee explained that “[c]riminals need to admit what they
did to begin healing. It will happen again if they do not heal.”18
Genocide denial laws criminalize statements that deny,
minimize, or glorify the established fact that a genocide occurred.19
Courts are granted the power to define actionable denial on a case-bycase basis, which creates a great deal of confusion over precisely what
constitutes genocide denial in any given jurisdiction. 20 This manner of
defining denial is controversial because the courts can decide such
matters without public debate or input from historians.21 Indeed, some
cases revolve around misstatements promulgated by historians.22
Furthermore, courts are charged with determining individual guilt or
innocence, rather than with setting the parameters of the historical
record for purposes of future denial litigation.23 Courts do not analyze
the entire context of an alleged genocide but rather the specific facts
that bear on the litigation.24
1. Defining Denialism
The majority of domestic denial statutes concern only denial of
genocide,25 rather than denial of other crimes against humanity, though
16. Parent, supra note 13, at 45.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 49.
19. See Paolo Lobba, Punishing Denialism Beyond Holocaust Denial: EU Framework Decision
2008/913/JHA and Other Expansive Trends, 5 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 58, 58 (2014) (discussing an
EU Framework decision that encouraged criminalization of the denial, justification, and gross
trivialization of the Holocaust and other international crimes).
20. Id. at 73–74.
21. Id.
22. See Anthony Lewis, Introduction to DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, HISTORY ON TRIAL: MY DAY IN
COURT WITH DAVID IRVING, at xi, xi–xiii (2005).
23. Lobba, supra note 19, at 73–74.
24. See, e.g., Fergal Gaynor, Uneasy Partners—Evidence, Truth and History in International
Trials, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1257 (2012) (examining the tension between admission of evidence
and creation of a historical record in international criminal courts).
25. Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas Hochmann, Introduction: Questioning the Criminalization
of Denials, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW, at xvii, xviii (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas
Hochmann eds., 2011). Genocide is comprised of a very limited class of conduct and differs from
other crimes of mass scale due to the special intent requirement, or dolus specialis, which requires
that the offender “intended to destroy, in whole or in part, [an] ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, arts. II–III,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (including direct and public
incitement to commit genocide as a related act punishable under the Convention). Genocidal acts
are not limited to murder—genocide includes causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a group in whole
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that is beginning to change.26 Denial is arguably the final stage of every
genocide—members of the perpetrating party or sympathizers may
deny crimes were committed at all or blame the victims. 27 Gregory
Stanton, President of Genocide Watch, argues that denial constitutes a
continued intent to destroy a victimized people group, thus extending
the crime of genocide to generations of survivors.28 Many denial and
minimization tactics may qualify as genocide denial. Perpetrators may
question or minimize the number of victims affected; attribute the harm
to other causes, such as famine, disease, or migration; or claim that the
victims were harmed during the course of self-defense by emphasizing
the losses suffered by the perpetrating party.29
Denial has been construed to encompass many types of
expression.30 At its core, genocide denial encompasses expressions that
either contest the existence of a genocide or question a characteristic
feature of the crime of genocide.31 An example of the former would be
the statement, “A genocide has never been perpetrated at Srebrenica”;
whereas, an example of the latter would be the statement, “Gas
chambers were not used to kill Jews during World War II.” Denial laws,
however, do not solely punish denial of factual events but also
expressions challenging the legal classification of events that were
characterized by a genocidal32 motive.33 Perinçek v. Switzerland, for
instance, concerned the legitimacy of a criminal conviction for
objections to the legal characterization of the atrocities committed
or in part, attempting to prevent births within a particular group, and forcibly transferring
children out of one group into another. See id. at art. II.
26. There is a trend in Europe of expanding the definition of denialism for purposes of
domestic prosecution: “[T]he conduct of publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing the
following international crimes: (a) genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined
in the statute of the International Criminal Court and, (b) the crimes defined in Article 6 of the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.” Lobba, supra note 19, at 64 (footnote omitted).
27. Gregory H. Stanton, The Ten Stages of Genocide, G ENOCIDE WATCH,
https://www.genocidewatch.com/ten-stages-genocide (last visited Oct. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
9QPL-CRWS].
28. See id. (noting that denial is a strong indicator of further genocidal acts).
29. Gregory Stanton, Twelve Ways to Deny a Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH,
http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/12-ways-to-deny-genocide/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/74MW-4SP7].
30. Hennebel & Hochmann, supra note 25, at xix.
31. Id.; see also Henry C. Theriault, Denial of Ongoing Atrocities as a Rationale for Not
Attempting to Prevent or Intervene, in IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION OF
GENOCIDE 47, 49 (Samuel Totten ed., 2017) (highlighting Ratko Mladic’s statements postarrest
that what occurred in Srebrenica could not be considered a genocide).
32. Acts of genocide are characterized by the dolus specialis, meaning that they are
characterized by “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.” Genocide Convention, supra note 25, at art. II.
33. See, e.g., Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 181 (addressing a conviction for
challenging the legal classification of atrocities against the Armenian people as genocide).
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against the Armenian people in 1915 as an act of genocide, rather than
as another type of crime against humanity.34 Denial can also serve as
propaganda used to sustain power under a particular regime or can
take the form of “revisionist history.”35 Mischaracterizing a genocide as
an act of self-defense, civil war, or unfortunate nonsystematic violence
can help commanders and other high-level perpetrators escape
accountability for their actions or nonactions.36
2. Prohibition of Denial at the Domestic Level
Although domestic jurisprudence approaches denialism in a
variety of ways, denial laws are consistent enough that they may be
addressed in the aggregate. Criminal prohibitions of genocide denial
were first limited to denial of the Holocaust and arose in states like
Germany that, compared to the broader international community, had
a “moral responsibility” to combat anti-Semitic acts in the latter half of
the twentieth century.37 The criminal prohibition of denial has since
extended to encompass genocides and international crimes beyond the
Holocaust.38 Many nations criminalize denial, including most European
states and Rwanda, and there has been a trend toward expanding those
laws in recent years.39 The European Union (“EU”) Framework
34. See id. at 219 (“The applicant had not called into question the reality of the massacres
and mass deportations, simply their legal characterization . . . .”). One of Perinçek’s exact
statements was:
[T]he allegations of the “Armenian genocide” are an international lie. . . . The Great
Powers, which wanted to divide the Ottoman Empire, provoked a section of the
Armenians, with whom we had lived in peace for centuries, and incited them to violence.
The Turks and Kurds defended their homeland from these attacks. It should not be
forgotten that Hitler used the same methods – that is to say, exploiting ethnic groups
and communities – to divide up countries for his own imperialistic designs, with peoples
killing one another. . . . Don’t believe the Hitler-style lies such as that of the “Armenian
genocide”. [sic] Seek the truth like Galileo, and stand up for it.
Id. at 196–97. The domestic court found that the characterization of the atrocities in Armenia as
genocide was an established historical fact. Id. at 202.
35. GUENTER LEWY, OUTLAWING GENOCIDE DENIAL: THE DILEMMAS OF OFFICIAL HISTORICAL
TRUTH 6–7 (2014).
36. See Theriault, supra note 31, at 49 (highlighting Nazi Karl Blessing, who covered up his
complicity in the Holocaust, convinced the public he was an anti-Nazi Resistance hero, and became
one of the most important German corporate leaders by the 1960s).
37. Lobba, supra note 19, at 69.
38. Id. at 70.
39. A sampling of the European States includes Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, and Romania. Sean Gorton, Note, The
Uncertain Future of Genocide Denial Laws in the European Union, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
421, 422–23 (2015). Note, however, that the United States is an outlier because the Supreme Court
has declared the regulation of group libel unconstitutional and thus outlaws prohibition of
genocide denial. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating local ordinance
that prohibited display of symbols arousing fear or anger based on race, color, creed, religion, or
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Decision, for instance, encouraged EU Member States to extend
genocide denial laws to encompass the justification, denial, and
trivialization of a broad array of atrocity crimes.40 These prohibitions
supplement other specific criminal offenses that bar direct and public
incitement to genocide.41
Most denial laws make genocide denial a strict liability offense.
European statutes prohibiting genocide denial do not typically include
a harm element—the offensive speech need not cause harm to anyone
or threaten anyone to be impermissible.42 With only one exception,
existing European denial statutes also do not require mens rea.43
Therefore, prosecutors do not need to prove that the perpetrator
intended to cause harm to anyone, and it is typically irrelevant whether
the perpetrator made his statement in good or bad faith.44 Making a
historically inaccurate statement is typically sufficient to sustain
criminal liability under the text of the relevant statutes. As a result of
denial laws’ lack of mens rea and harm elements, qualifying statements
can violate denialism statutes per se without evidence of the intent to
harm victims of genocide or tarnish the relevant cultural memory.45 To
be more precise, the purpose of the statement remains irrelevant to the
completion of the offense, which in turn potentially permits charges
based on good faith assertions raised during international litigation.
3. Denial of Individual Responsibility
Genocide denial laws do not directly address individual denial of
responsibility—denial of individual responsibility instead falls at the
intersection of legislative text, policy underlying denial laws, and the
fundamental due process rights of international criminal defendants.
Academic understandings of genocide denial, however, have been
stretched broadly enough to capture the following behaviors: denying
gender); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (noting that a general attack on
governmental action did not support libel claim by particular official).
40. Lobba, supra note 19, at 58. The EU Framework Decision was a legally binding act
establishing objectives the EU Member States were required to fulfill, though states could choose
the way in which they implemented the required objectives. See Framework Decision, EU
MONITOR, https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vh7dotmxlyyu (last visited Oct.
21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/WB7B-E973].
41. See, e.g., Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (Proxmire Act), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1091.
42. Hennebel & Hochmann, supra note 25, at xxiii.
43. Thomas Hochmann, Denier’s Intent, in GENOCIDE DENIALS AND THE LAW, supra note 25,
at 279, 298.
44. Id. at 317.
45. See id. at 298 (explaining the lack of mental and result elements in many contemporary
denial laws).
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genocidal intent, denying personal or group criminal culpability,
blaming the victims, and intimidating witnesses.46
This Note does not raise a purely theoretical dilemma.
International criminal defense attorneys have been charged with
genocide denial for statements denying the legal characterization of the
genocide for which their clients were charged. American defense
attorney Peter Erlinder, practicing before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), was charged with minimizing the
Rwandan genocide.47 The Rwandan prosecuting authorities, referring
to Erlinder’s work at the ICTR, stated, “Carl Peter Erlinder denied and
minimized the genocide . . . by stating that the soldiers he was
defending neither planned nor carried out the genocide.”48 In Bagosora
et al. v. Prosecutor, the ICTR found that defense counselor Erlinder
would be entitled to immunity from arrest49 for spoken or written
statements made on behalf of his client, Aloys Ntabakuze, that
otherwise might be construed as denial of the Rwandan genocide.50 All
but one of Erlinder’s controversial comments, however, were made in
personal publications and at public conferences rather than during the
express defense of his client.51 As such, the ICTR Appeals Chamber held
that Erlinder’s comments were not protected by his functional

46. See ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 2017) (providing
a survey of a wide range of scholarship on genocide, including denial in particular); see also
Stanton, supra note 27 (enumerating denial as the final “stage” of genocide and noting the role
lawyers sometimes play in denial).
47. Kashmir Hill, ‘Genocide-Denying’ Law Professor Peter Erlinder Imprisoned in Rwanda,
ABOVE THE LAW (June 2, 2010, 12:21 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/genocide-denying-lawprofessor-peter-erlinder-imprisoned-in-rwanda/ [https://perma.cc/5FSC-R5MA].
48. Krit Zeegers, Defence Counsel Immunity at the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
869, 873 (2011).
49. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. VI, § 22(b),
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention]
(granting UN officials “[i]mmunity from legal process of every kind” for “words spoken or written
and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission”).
50. See Bagosora v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s
Motion for Injunctions Against the Government of Rwanda Regarding the Arrest and Investigation
of Lead Counsel Peter Erlinder, ¶¶ 19–20, 28 (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.worldcourts.com/
ictr/eng/decisions/2010.10.06_Bagosora_v_Prosecutor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KTQ-X5NX].
In
Erlinder’s case, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that to adequately represent their clients,
defense attorneys needed the ability to argue on behalf of their clients without fear of legal
repercussions. See Gentian Zyberi, Functional Immunity for Defence Counsel, INT’L L. OBSERVER
(Oct. 10, 2010), https://internationallawobserver.eu/functional-immunity-of-defence-counsel
[https://perma.cc/9M97-N5A4] (discussing how the ICTY Appeals Chamber has treated the issue
similarly and found that functional immunity for defense counselors was necessary to the proper
functioning of the Tribunal).
51. Erlinder stated in numerous publications that the atrocities committed in Rwanda in
1994 were “civilians-on-civilians” killings and could not be characterized as genocide. Alexis S.
Kramer, Introductory Note to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Bagosora et al. v.
Prosecutor, 50 I.L.M. 226, 226 (2011).
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immunity as defense counsel with a UN tribunal.52 The distinction
between service to the client and statements made in an attorney’s
personal capacity raises two concerns. First, it is not entirely clear
whether statements made outside of the courtroom—statements
advocating for the client’s innocence at a press conference, for
instance—would be entitled to immunity. Second, the qualified
immunity given to defense attorneys does not necessarily protect an
attorney from being arrested, charged, and tried for denial during an
ongoing international criminal case.
Although defense attorneys are entitled to immunity in their
role as agents to the UN ad hoc tribunals, international criminal
defendants, witnesses, and scholars receive no such immunity.53 The
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has endorsed a criminal
conviction in a domestic court for a scholar’s denial of a perpetrator’s
individual responsibility for genocide, even though the scholar did not
dispute the genocide’s existence. In Witzsch v. Germany, the ECtHR
considered whether letters disputing the responsibility of Adolf Hitler
and the Nazi Party for the organization and planning of the Holocaust
constituted genocide denial.54 Although the ECtHR considered the
question through the lens of freedom of expression, it supported
domestic conviction for denial.55 The ECtHR held that denial of the
Holocaust’s “equally significant and established circumstance[s]” stood
in direct contravention of both the text and purpose of the European
52. Id. at 227.
53. Concerns regarding lack of immunity are heightened further in cases where defendants
proceed pro se. Compare Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 49, at art. VI, § 22(b)
(providing statement immunities only for experts, such as counsel), with Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3, arts. 18–21, Sept.
10, 2002 (providing statement immunities for not only counsel but also witnesses, victims, and
other experts).
54. See Witzsch v. Germany, App. No. 7485/03, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72786 [https://perma.cc/7AX5-QWPX]:
It is actually established that there is no indication in party programs of the National
Socialist German Workers’ Party, the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei), that the NSDAP and Hitler intended to murder the Jews. Anybody who
– with all the means at his disposal – fostered the emigration of the Jewish minority
until late after the beginning of the Second World War can hardly be said to have
prepared the murder of the Jews. A long time ago, the historian Irving has publicly
proposed to pay a thousand pounds to any person who could prove that Hitler had
ordered, for racial reasons, the murder of one single Jew. So far, nobody has produced
evidence. After the war, tens of thousands of totally immaculate officials of the NSDAP
have attested on oath not to have known until the end of the war about the murder of
Jews. None of the dignitaries of the German Government accused in Nuremberg
admitted to have known about the mass murder of Jews. Not even in their closing words
under the gallows!;
see also Lobba, supra note 19, at 74 (discussing the Witzsch case).
55. Witzsch, App. No. 7485/03, at 4.
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Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and thus could not be protected
by the freedom of expression.56 The Court considered Hitler’s initiation
and desired outcome of the Holocaust to be “common knowledge” and
found that Wiztsch’s statements disparaged the dignity of the victims.57
Denial of individual responsibility could be considered denial of
a specific legal characterization of fact—the guilt of the convicted—but
courts have addressed denial of legal characterization in a variety of
ways. In Perinçek v. Switzerland, for instance, the ECtHR held that an
applicant’s conviction for publicly denouncing the Armenian genocide’s
classification as a genocide constituted a violation of the ECHR.58
Perinçek did not deny the existence of the massacre but denied that the
massacre amounted to genocide—specifically, he argued that the laws
of war justified the massacre, and it therefore could not be considered
genocide.59 Perinçek’s characterization of the massacre allegedly
contradicted the generally accepted legal characterization of the
atrocities.60 The Court reasoned, however, that denial of legal
characterization of the Armenian massacre did not carry the same risk
of inciting violence as genocide denial.61 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the denial of historical fact is far graver than denial of
an event’s legal characterization.62
Arguably, criminal sanctions are unlikely to be imposed for mere
disputes about legal classifications unless there is independent
evidence of a pressing social need for prosecution.63 The question then
becomes whether, after an individual has been convicted of genocide in
an international tribunal, his conviction becomes a legal
characterization of reality.64 It has been argued that decisions of
56. Witzsch, App. No. 7485/03, at 3 (noting that even though Witzsch did not deny the
Holocaust as such, his denial of Hitler’s and the NSDAP’s responsibility disparaged the dignity of
the deceased and constituted denial of “the victims’ extremely cruel and unique fate”); see also
Lobba, supra note 19, at 74 (considering the challenges presented where characterization of
historical events forms the basis of criminal liability).
57. Witzsch, App. No. 7485/03, at 8 (“[Witzsch’s] statement that the opinion expressed by
[well-known historian, Professor Wolffson] was part of the war propaganda and after-war atrocity
propaganda combined with [his] denial of Hitler’s and the national Socialists’ responsibility in the
extermination of the Jews showed the applicant’s disdain towards the victims of the Holocaust.”).
58. Lobba, supra note 19, at 59.
59. Perinçek v. Switzerland, 2015-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 181, ¶ 106.
60. Id. at ¶ 127.
61. Lobba, supra note 19, at 66.
62. Id. at 72.
63. See id. at 76–77 (explaining that the requirement that an interference with freedom of
expression be “necessary in a democratic society” implies there must be a “pressing social need”
justifying punishment).
64. Language used in discussions of “denial of legal characterizations” is disturbingly broad.
For instance, the President of the IRMCT stated in a letter to the President of the Security Council,
“[t]he facts that have been proved beyond reasonable doubt provide the foundation for a shared
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international tribunals should not be treated as the definitive authority
on a fact’s legal characterization—partly because international
prosecution is selective, raising equal treatment concerns, and partly
because international tribunal decisions are not always consistent, nor
do they necessarily reflect consensus regarding the characterization of
disputed facts.65 If conviction qualifies as a legal characterization,
however, then postconviction denial of guilt could constitute genocide
denial. Public statements made by the Prosecutor and Judge Agius, the
President of the Mechanism, discussed below in Part I.B, suggest that
the ever-evolving policy of the IRMCT would not prohibit such
a characterization.
B. Statements Made Before the UN Security Council Regarding
Genocide Denial Policy
Individual views expressed at meetings of the UN Security
Council (“Security Council”) set the tone of proceedings for the following
judicial season and influence the way states view international criminal
legal issues, conduct domestic proceedings for international crimes, and
support the international tribunals in their endeavors.66 Because
international criminal jurisprudence and the individual fates of
understanding of the recent past as an essential element of reconciliation and positive regional
relations.” U.N. President of the IRMCT, Letter dated May 17, 2017 from the President of the
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. S/2017/434, annex II (May 17, 2017). It is unclear what all falls
into the broad category of facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is not unwarranted to
think that individual responsibility qualifies.
65. See Dov Jacobs, Mladic Judgment: Yet Another New Finding on Genocide in the
Municipalities?, SPREADING JAM (Nov. 22, 2017), https://dovjacobs.com/2017/11/22/mladicjudgment-yet-another-new-finding-on-genocide-in-the-municipalities/
[https://perma.cc/55CL5F4Y]:
[I]t seems that the reasoning of the majority of the Chamber actually departs from the
Karadzic Judgment. . . . We now therefore have two different legal findings in the case
law in relation to the intent of the direct perpetrators of the crimes committed in the
Municipalities, a discrepancy that will need to be resolved on appeal, both in the
Karadzic and Mladic cases;
see also Lobba, supra note 19, at 76–77 (noting the possibility for abuse that arises when judicial
discretion influences what historical characterizations are punishable). But see U.N. President of
the IRMCT, Letter dated Nov. 19, 2018 from the President of the International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 43, U.N.
Doc. S/2018/1033, annex II (Nov. 19, 2018) (“Establishing [the existence of a genocide in Rwanda]
and other facts about the Rwandan genocide was one of the Tribunal’s most important
contributions to re-establishing peace and security in Rwanda and promoting reconciliation
between the affected communities.”).
66. See David P. Forsythe, The UN Security Council and Response to Atrocities: International
Criminal Law and the P-5, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 840, 843 (2012) (enumerating the various ways the
Security Council has directly influenced the norms, institutions, and implementation of
international criminal law).
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international criminal defendants are uniquely dependent on the
prosecutors’ charging decisions and the judges’ individual
interpretations of the law, the beliefs of international criminal
prosecutors and judges are paramount. Thus, it is important to ensure
that the statements made to the Security Council, and the implications
of those statements, properly balance the objectives of reconciliation
and justice for victims with the full weight of due process for
defendants, with an eye toward maintaining the legitimacy of the
international tribunals.
During a December 2018 briefing of the Security Council,
IRMCT Prosecutor Brammertz referred to the denial of personal
responsibility by individuals convicted by the international tribunals
and suggested that such denial constitutes glorification of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.67 Prosecutor Brammertz
declared, “Positive steps [to prosecute individuals for genocide] are
undermined by irresponsible comments from other officials denying
what has been established beyond reasonable doubt by international
courts, and portraying as heroes men who committed the most serious
violations of international law.”68 Some genocide denial statutes include
glorification of genocide as a punishable offense.69 Therefore,
Brammertz’s statement insinuated that an official’s denial of an
individual’s personal responsibility could potentially be criminally
prosecuted as a form of genocide denial.
At the 2019 annual meeting of the Security Council on the
subject of the operation of the IRMCT, Prosecutor Brammertz,
President Agius, and state representatives again addressed the
challenges to accountability and reconciliation posed by the glorification
of convicted war criminals and genocide denial.70 The discussion aimed
to help ensure that perpetrators of atrocity crimes do not escape
punishment and that hate speech advocating discrimination does not

67. Brammertz Address, supra note 7.
68. Id.
69. See JEROEN TEMPERMAN, RELIGIOUS HATRED AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
PROHIBITION OF INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE OR DISCRIMINATION 303–04 (2016):
[B]y ‘glorifying’ historical crimes against humanity someone more or less expressly
incites to similar crimes being perpetrated in the near future against the same group.
Even short of a direct call for action, the person who glorifies atrocities obviously makes
it explicit that he or she did not quite mind that they occurred in the past and thus
implies that he or she would not mind if they were to occur again.
70. See U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8681st mtg. at 6–7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8681 (Dec. 11, 2019)
(“[T]here are still concerted efforts to deny the Rwandan genocide, particularly among Rwanda
diaspora communities. . . . [F]or a number of years . . . written reports have underscored that the
denial of crimes and the glorification of convicted war criminals are pervasive throughout the
former Yugoslavia, and the situation continues to get worse.”).
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persist.71 In a discussion of contempt cases before the IRMCT,
Prosecutor Brammertz stated that although “it is necessary that the
Mechanism provide the opportunity to convicted persons to seek review
of their convictions when legitimate new facts arise,” the Prosecutor’s
Office would “firmly stand against any attempt to undermine the
judgments of the ICTR, the ICTY and the Mechanism through the
commission of [] crimes.” 72 Although Prosecutor Brammertz was
specifically referring to the crime of contempt, the statement was
sufficiently broad to encompass the crime of genocide denial. When
interpreted in such a way, the IRMCT Prosecutor proclaimed to the
Security Council that his office would stand firmly against an attempt
to undermine the judgments of the tribunals through appeals rooted in
statements that constitute genocide denial. During the discussion,
there was a call for states to counter the glorification of convicted
criminals by combatting the denial of atrocity crimes. 73
Of further concern, the French Ambassador directly implied that
advocating individual innocence of genocide charges postconviction
should be guarded against as a form of genocide denial. 74 Specifically,
he stated, “Denials of genocide and the glorification of war criminals
convicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the
ICTR and subsequently the Mechanism, following impartial and
independent proceedings, are unacceptable.”75 This statement
effectively implies approval of the criminalization of appeals from
genocide convictions, even if that implication was unintentional. The
right to appeal, however, prohibits criminalization as a component of
fundamental fair trial rights.
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO APPEAL IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
The due process rights to which international criminal
defendants are entitled are derived from the tribunals’ respective
statutes and rules of procedure, informed by the jurisprudence of the
71. See id. at 13–15:
[T]he issue of war crimes remains an open wound in the Western Balkans. We see with
concern a rise in incendiary rhetoric and historical revisionism with regard to war
crimes in the region, which is a major hurdle for much-needed reconciliation and also
an impediment for strengthening good-neighbourly relations, especially between
Kosovo and Serbia.
72. Id. at 5. ICTR and ICTY refer to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, respectively.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 10.
75. Id.
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international criminal tribunals, and shaped by customary
international law. “A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a
perfect one.”76 This notion of fairness requires that the international
tribunals fully respect internationally recognized standards of due
process at every stage of the proceedings.77 The concern here is the
effect of international criminal justice policy regarding genocide denial
on the right to appeal and on the substantive scope of rights a convicted
person is entitled to during the appeals process. Appeals are an error
correction mechanism that feature heavily in developed legal systems
because they protect against miscarriages of justice, help maintain
consistency, and provide an avenue for maintaining legitimacy.78 The
international criminal justice system should respect due process:
[Respect for due process] is important not only due to the relevance assigned to the respect
of fundamental human rights in criminal proceedings, but also due to the peculiarity of
international jurisdictions, which cannot rely on a long tradition and therefore require, in
order to act as legitimate bodies, strict adherence to the rights of the accused. Moreover,
such an example is essential for the establishment of the rule of law in the states
concerned, and for purposes of furthering peace and reconciliation. It is crucial that justice
is done, and seen to be done.79

The inclusion of appeals in the international criminal justice process,
and the due process rights afforded to convicted persons on appeal,
76. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 433 (2009).
77. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, ¶¶ 34, 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993):
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen
sine lege [sic] requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so
that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does
not arise;
see also Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 21, 2003), https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-0521%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jxn%20Challenge.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C868-BPV2]; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶ 197
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/
vasiljevic/tjug/en/vas021129.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP32-URPG] (“The scope of the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction ratione materiae is determined by customary international law as it existed at the time
when the acts charged in the indictment were allegedly committed. This limitation placed on the
Tribunal is justified by concerns for the principle of legality.” (footnote omitted)).
78. See Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J.
COMPAR. & INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2011) (outlining the multiple purposes appeals serve by correcting
errors); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 416 (2009)
(“Developed legal systems make provision for correcting error. Error—in the sense of good faith
differences of opinion about finding the facts or about formulating or applying rules of law—is
expected as a regular occurrence.”).
79. Fausto Pocar, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 76 (Roberto Bellelli ed., Routledge 2016) (2010).
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serve to counter a common criticism of international courts—that they
are a forum for show trials and a form of victors’ justice. 80 Therefore,
the appeals process is critical to the maintenance of the legitimacy of
the international criminal tribunals.
A. Right to Appeal
An individual has the right to seek review of an otherwise final
conviction handed down by the international criminal adjudicative
bodies.81 The IRMCT Rules of Procedure and Evidence state that “[t]he
rules of procedure and evidence that govern proceedings in the Trial
Chambers and before the Single Judge shall apply [equally] to
proceedings in the Appeals Chamber.”82 Such rules include the
mandatory assignment of defense counsel when demanded by the
interests of justice and the assurance of the defendant’s right to call
witnesses and present evidence.83
The tribunals have established a practice of relying on human
rights jurisprudence to inform decisions regarding the rights of
offenders. For instance, when deciding The Media Case, the ICTR Trial
Chamber relied on international jurisprudence from the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal, the UN Human Rights Committee,
and the ECtHR to balance accountability for genocide incitement with
the fundamental right to freedom of expression. 84 The ICTY similarly
relied on the ECHR and its jurisprudence in cases involving threats to
human rights.85 The international tribunals have also demonstrated

80. See, e.g., James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the Law?: Judging and Punishing at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 140 (2003)
(considering the possibility of “victor’s justice” in ICTY verdicts).
81. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1966 supra note 4, art. 24 (providing for appeal in the event new facts
are discovered).
82. Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals, Rule 131, U.N. Doc. MICT/1/Rev.6 (Dec. 18, 2019) [hereinafter IRMCT Rules of
Procedure and Evidence].
83. Id. Rules 43, 102.
84. See Nahimana v. Prosecutor (The Media Case), Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement,
¶¶ 693–94 (Nov. 28, 2007), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acdec/en/90216EV36313.htm
[https://perma.cc/W7GT-338J]; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 980 (Dec. 3, 2003), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr99-52/trial-judgements/en/031203.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UEQ-DV2N].
85. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal
on Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 24 n.21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 1999),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acdec/en/90216EV36313.htm
[https://perma.cc/YEU5BNX8] (referencing a number of judgements concerned with art. 6(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights); Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on the Motion for
Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic, ¶¶ 59–60, 67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 22, 1997), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dokmanovic/tdec/fr/71022MS2.htm
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understanding of their obligation to abide by the fair trial rights
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).86 By adopting internationally recognized fair trial rights, the
international tribunals have established legitimacy,87 as well as the
minimum standards with which international criminal courts
should comply.88
B. Due Process Rights During Appeals Under
Customary International Law
Customary International Law (“CIL”) is an authoritative source
for standards of due process and the substantive rights defendants are
entitled to on appeal.89 The ICTY Statute (adopted by the Security
Council) required the ICTY to apply rules that were deemed to
undoubtedly constitute CIL,90 and international criminal tribunals
have been known to take creative approaches in determining what
constitutes CIL.91 The international tribunals have established a
pattern of reliance on human rights treaties, regional human rights
tribunal judgments, and the practice of domestic courts as embodying
the baseline due process rights owed to international criminal
defendants.92 In fact, international criminal tribunals are generally
[https://perma.cc/P48K-48T2] (referencing article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human
Right to determine the rights of a detainee).
86. See Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting
Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 28 (2009) (showing adherence to fair trial
rights by ad hoc tribunals).
87. See David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law 13–14 (July 2008) (unpublished working paper), https://scholarship.
law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=fwps_papers [https://perma.cc/TR
8Z-ABHE] (explaining how fair practices bolster the legitimacy of international tribunals).
88. See Schomburg, supra note 86, at 28–29 (emphasizing the value of fair trial rights as a
minimum standard).
89. CIL is a source of international law that derives authority from Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. See NOORA ARAJÄRVI, THE CHANGING NATURE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2014) (explaining the authority of CIL and how it informs international
judicial processes). Customary international law is comprised of widespread state practice and
opinio juris—acts, or sometimes omissions, of states that are made under some sense of obligation
to act in such a way as a matter of law. Id.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 1.
92. See, e.g., Nahimana v. Prosecutor (The Media Case), Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement,
¶¶ 693–94 (Nov. 28, 2007), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-9952/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/071128.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48TJ-AUN2]
(looking
to
jurisprudence from the IMT, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and the European
Court of Human Rights); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16,
1999), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acdec/en/90216EV36313.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZU4F-XMCP] (focusing on past judgments of the European Court of Human Rights); Prosecutor v.
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expected to aspire to the highest standards codified in human rights
treaties and customary international law.93
1. Appeal Rights as Reflected in Regional Human Rights Treaties
Human rights treaties serve as evidence of widespread state
practice and deserve consideration in determining whether there is a
universally recognized right to appeal, as well as the substance of such
a right.94 The ICCPR 95 and the ECHR96 are instructive on this point
because the international criminal tribunals are dedicated to ensuring
that they do not compromise the rights of defendants. 97 Article 14(5) of
the ICCPR provides for a broad right to appeal: “Everyone convicted of
a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being
reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.” 98 This right to appeal
is situated within the broader fair trial rights, and the goal is to

Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures
for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed “B” Through to “M,” ¶ 27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 28, 1997), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/70428PM2.htm
[https://perma.cc/KKE5-65UQ] (“[D]ecisions on the provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights . . . and the European Convention on Human Rights . . . have been found
to be authoritative and applicable.”); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. lT-95-16-T, Judgement,
¶¶ 537–42
(Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
14,
2000),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J33-NXTU]
(highlighting the importance of analyzing established patterns); Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case No.
IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on the Request for Release Submitted by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic,
¶¶ 59–60, 67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 22, 1997), https://www.icty.org/
x/cases/dokmanovic/tdec/fr/71022MS2.htm [https://perma.cc/P48K-48T2] (analyzing human rights
treaties and international tribunals to find established patterns); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case
No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 980 (Dec. 3, 2003), https://unictr.irmct.org/
sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-52/trial-judgements/en/031203.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UQC2-K2ES] (“[A] review of international law and jurisprudence . . . is helpful as a guide . . . .”).
93. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions, ¶ 38
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan
_milosevic/tdec/en/1110873516829.htm [https://perma.cc/QTG7-ZXK8] (“This provision [of the
ICCPR regarding the right of a detainee to receive a hearing] is not reflected in the International
Tribunal’s Statute. However , [sic] as one of the fundamental human rights of an accused person
under customary international law, it is . . . applicable . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law,
41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275 (1965) (discussing the role of multilateral treaties in determining the
content of customary international law).
95. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(5), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
96. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953).
97. Patrick Robinson, The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific Reference
to the Work of the ICTY, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 1, 9 (2009).
98. ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 14(5).
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“ensur[e] the proper administration of justice.”99 In Prosecutor v. Tadić,
the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that an individual convicted of
contempt had the right to appeal and proclaimed that Article 14 of the
ICCPR, which grants the right to appeal, reflected “an imperative norm
of international law to which the Tribunal must adhere.” 100 Further
dicta from a case in the Special Court for Sierra Leone considered
Article 14 of the ICCPR to have jus cogens101 status as a fundamental
principle of international law.102 Additionally, the Secretary-General of
the UN has mandated that international criminal tribunals “respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the
accused at all stages of [the] proceedings,” specifically referencing the
ICCPR as a binding legal instrument.103
Numerous fair trial rights included in the ICCPR also apply
during the appeals process and are persuasive in the international
tribunals as a representation of customary international law.104 These
rights include the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to
bring witnesses on the defendant’s behalf.105 Assistance of counsel—a
99. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to Equality Before
Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007)
[hereinafter General Comment 32].
100. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of
Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, at ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 27, 2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/vuj-aj010227e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5LVW-8ZL3]; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 104, 113
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/
aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC7C-GP8Z] (“The right of appeal is a
component of the fair trial requirement set out in Article 14 of the ICCPR, and Article 21(4) of the
Statute. The right to a fair trial is, of course, a requirement of customary international law.”
(footnote omitted)); Prosecutor v Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 177 (July 21,
2000), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VZNW8WZ] (stating that the right to an impartial tribunal was “generally recognised as being an
integral component of the requirement that an accused should have a fair trial”).
101. Jus cogens norms in international law are considered fundamental legal norms from
which derogation is never permitted. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The
Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 63 (1993) (“The modern international law doctrine of
jus cogens asserts the existence of fundamental legal norms from which no derogation
is permitted.”).
102. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-09-PT, Decision on the Applications for
a Stay of Proceedings and Denial of Right to Appeal, ¶ 19 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Nov. 4,
2003), http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2003.11.04_Prosecutor_v_Norman_Kallon_
Gbao2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LRN-J8JQ] (noting “that the very agreement by the UN to the terms
of Article 20 of the Special Court Statute affords some evidence that [Article 14(5)] has indeed
reached the status termed by international lawyers ‘jus cogens’ ”). It is important to note that the
right to appeal is not broadly considered to be a jus cogens norm, but it is granted such esteemed
status by some.
103. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, ¶¶ 106–07, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
104. See Marshall, supra note 78, at 18 (“A number of the fair trial rights in article 14 are
directly applicable to appeals.”).
105. ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 14(3)(d)–(e).
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protective measure against being arbitrarily prosecuted—is
“paramount to the concept of due process.” 106 Defendants must also
have access when necessary to witnesses, evidence, and other essentials
of criminal justice in a manner that does not compromise the
defendant’s integrity.107 In an expression of best practices, the UN
Human Rights Committee has gone so far as to outline the essential
features of the right to appeal—convicted persons must have “effective
access to the appellate system,” as well as “substantive review of
conviction and sentence.”108 The Committee’s interpretation requires
first that all convicted persons have the right to seek review and second
that the process is not merely discretionary.109 The right to substantive
review requires that both conviction and sentence be “review[ed]
substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the
law, . . . such that the procedure allows for due consideration of the
nature of the case.”110 The ICCPR should not be construed as
establishing two different standards of due process for domestic courts
and international tribunals;111 therefore, international defendants
should be able to rely on the ICCPR’s minimum standards.
The ECHR itself does not require access to an appeal,112 but if
such a right is granted, the fair trial rights guaranteed in Article 6 of
the Convention apply in full to appellate proceedings. 113 The right to
appeal, however, does feature in Protocol No. 7 to the European
Convention.114 The ECtHR has provided that although states have the

106. Schomburg, supra note 86, at 16 (quoting M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 818 (2d rev. ed. 2013)).
107. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 119 (2002).
108. Marshall, supra note 78, at 18.
109. Ratiani v. Georgia, Views, ¶¶ 11.2–11.3, Communication No. 975/2001, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/975/2001 (July 21, 2005).
110. General Comment 32, supra note 99, at ¶¶ 48, 58 (noting that the right to an effective
appeal is lex specialis vis-à-vis the generalized right to an effective remedy); see also Bandajevsky
v. Belarus, Views, ¶ 10.13, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1100/2002 (Mar. 28,
2006) (“[T]he right to appeal . . . imposes on States parties a duty substantially to review conviction
and sentence, both as to sufficiency of the evidence and of the law.”).
111. Robinson, supra note 97, at 9.
112. See STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 362–63 (2005)
(“[I]nternational human-rights law is not concerned with the uniform and correct application of
national law . . . .”).
113. Poulsen v. Denmark, App. No. 32092/96, at 5 (June 29, 2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-5376 [https://perma.cc/7CQM-5Y9T] (“As far as Article 6 is concerned the Court recalls
that this provision does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal but where
such courts do exist, the guarantees of Article 6 must be complied with . . . .”).
114. Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 2, ¶¶ 1–2, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. No. 117:
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power to regulate access to appellate review, any such restrictions must
be instituted in pursuit of a legitimate aim and must not infringe on the
essence of the right to appeal. 115 Thus, Article 6 of the ECHR
guarantees that fair trial rights apply in full to appellate proceedings.116
2. Widespread State Practice Concerning Appeal Rights
State practice firmly supports consideration of appeal rights as
an affirmative premise of the fullest view of established human rights.
In most jurisdictions, convicted persons have a right to appeal their
convictions arising either from the jurisdiction’s respective constitution
or statutory law.117 A review of state practice reveals that one’s right to
appeal a criminal conviction consists of “the opportunity to access a
fair process that permits adequate and effective review of
one’s conviction.”118
Overall, widespread state practice dictates that when a right to
appeal is granted, it must be meaningful. The right to appeal was
included in the Protocols of the ECHR, which ensured its adoption by
almost every European State.119 Additionally, in South Africa and New
Zealand, the right to appeal is considered a fundamental human
right.120 In South Africa, the right to appeal is guaranteed by section
35(3) of the South African Constitution as an extension of the right to a
fair trial.121 The right consists of the “opportunity to have [one’s]
conviction and sentence ‘adequately reappraised.’ ”122 In New Zealand,
section 25(h) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that
every convicted person has the right to appeal his conviction or sentence
as a “[m]inimum standard[ ] of criminal procedure.”123 This right

Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his
conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right,
including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.
This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences of a minor character, as
prescribed by law, or in cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first
instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against acquittal.
115. Gurepka
v.
Ukraine,
App.
No.
61406/00,
¶ 59
(Sept.
6,
2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70094 [https://perma.cc/7P8A-6SSH].
116. Poulsen, App. No. 32092/96, at 5 (June 29, 2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0015376 [https://perma.cc/7CQM-5Y9T].
117. Marshall, supra note 78, at 1.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 24–25.
120. Id. at 17.
121. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 35(3)(o) (“Every accused person has a right to a fair trial,
which includes the right . . . of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.”).
122. Shinga v. State 2007 (4) SA 611 (CC), at para. 40 (S. Afr.).
123. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(h).
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requires “an effective right of appeal which so far as is reasonably
possible will ensure that justice is done in the appeal process,” and the
court must give adequate consideration to the merits of the appeal.124
Adequate consideration of the merits cannot occur absent full
observance of due process.125 Further, while Canadian courts have not
given great consideration to the right to appeal, the Supreme Court of
Canada has established that “[w]here a party has a right of appeal, the
law presupposes that the exercise of that right is to be meaningful.”126
There is significant agreement among jurisdictions about the
substance of the right to appeal—appeals must be adequate and
effective.127 Adequacy requires review of the merits of both the legal and
factual bases of conviction.128 Effectiveness is typically achieved by
fulfilling prerequisites set by the respective jurisdiction in order to
secure meaningful appellate review.129 Convicted persons will often
require assistance of counsel to ensure they have adequate and effective
access to the appeals process.130 Furthermre, appellants’ ability to
participate in the appellate process must be fair, both to the individual
appellant and between groups of appellants.131 Therefore, appellate
processes must not discriminate between different classes of
appellants.132 In conclusion, it is undeniable that international criminal
defendants are entitled to appeal their convictions in an effective and
adequate manner.
III. ANALYSIS
In light of the fact that genocide denial is harmful to the
survivors of genocide, it must be determined whether criminalizing a
convicted person’s denial of individual responsibility is a permissible,
or even effective, measure to address genocide denial. Denials of
individual responsibility for genocide are not uncommon.133 Take for

124. Taito v. R [2002] UKPC 15, [2003] 3 NZLR 577 at 596–97 (N.Z.).
125. Id. at 597.
126. R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, para. 66 (Can.).
127. Marshall, supra note 78, at 39.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 41.
130. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1963) (noting that denying the
indigent counsel on appeal is invidious discrimination); Shinga v. State 2007 (4) SA 611 (CC), at
para. 6 (S. Afr.) (noting that counsel is important to assure an adequate appeal).
131. Marshall, supra note 78, at 43.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Andrew MacDowall, Ratko Mladic Says He Had Nothing to Do with the
Srebrenica Massacre, INDEPENDENT (May 30, 2011), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/ratko-mladic-says-he-had-nothing-to-do-with-the-srebrenica-massacre-2290803.html
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example, Khieu Samphan—former Khmer Rouge leader who responded
to his UN tribunal indictment by arguing that he was not involved with
the atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge regime.134 Although
he never denied the massive casualty count, he vehemently denied that
he was directly responsible.135 Looking back further in history reveals
similar tactics following World War II.136 Karl Blessing, a member of
the Nazi party, shielded his complicity in the Holocaust and presented
himself to the post-World War II world as an “anti-Nazi [r]esistance
hero.”137 The question is not whether these two men were telling the
truth but whether they had the right to assert their innocence
regardless of its truth.
A. Denial of Individual Responsibility Should Not
Constitute Genocide Denial
The fundamental right to appeal under international law
prohibits characterizing individual denial of responsibility as genocide
denial. International criminal tribunals are required to aspire to the
highest standards of due process embodied in human rights treaties and
customary international law.138 Because international criminal
tribunals opted to provide a right to appeal, that right should be
meaningful (adequate and effective), and it should not be arbitrarily
denied to those seeking review of genocide convictions as opposed to
those seeking review of other convictions.139
The right to appeal is an extension of the due process rights that
guarantee a fair trial because it permits review of trial procedure, as
well as legal and factual determinations.140 “[I]t would be inconceivable
that an international tribunal (especially one trying such serious
[https://perma.cc/53S3-7UKK] (reporting on Ratko Mladic’s denial of responsibility for the
massacre at Srebrenica as he tried to avoid extradition to The Hague for trial).
134. Theriault, supra note 31, at 49.
135. Id.; see also Genocide Charge for Khmer Rouge Leader Khieu Samphan, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8419789.stm (last updated Dec. 18, 2009, 5:04 AM)
[https://perma.cc/9GUS-EGY4] (discussing Samphan’s denial of direct responsibility for the deaths
under the Khmer Rouge’s rule).
136. See, e.g., Theriault, supra note 31, at 49 (discussing a former Nazi’s use of the
same tactics).
137. Id.
138. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions, ¶¶ 37–
38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/
slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/1110873516829.htm [https://perma.cc/EL83-W2UU].
139. See Marshall, supra note 78, at 42–44 (discussing the need for the appellate process to be
fair between groups of appellants).
140. See General Comment 32, supra note 99, at ¶ 2 (“The right to equality before the courts
and tribunals and to a fair trial is a key element of human rights protection and serves as a
procedural means to safeguard the rule of law.”).
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crimes) would be held less stringently to human rights norms than
national legal systems.”141 Therefore, effectively withdrawing a
convicted person’s ability to appeal his conviction or sentence by
denying a defendant the ability to proclaim his innocence would reduce
the legitimacy of the international criminal tribunals. 142 Review is a
critical tool for ensuring a defendant’s rights are respected during the
trial phase.
The right to an appeal is further degraded by infringement on
the attorney-client relationship. If lawyers face criminal charges for
proclamations of a client’s innocence, there are two logical results. First,
lawyers may be incapacitated through arrest during their clients’ trials,
depriving international criminal defendants of counsel and delaying the
trial process.143 Second, if lawyers understand the criminal sanctions
they might face for zealously advocating on behalf of their clients, they
may forego opportunities to argue genocide cases at the appellate and
perhaps even at the trial levels. Individual states with genocide denial
laws and the international criminal courts should endeavor to observe
the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, which aim to ensure
that lawyers “are able to perform all of their professional
functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or
improper interference.”144
Characterizing denial of individual responsibility as genocide
denial would have a chilling effect on appeals in the international
criminal adjudicative bodies. First, defendants would likely be more
hesitant to lodge appeals. Second, criminalizing denial of an
individual’s responsibility threatens an appellant’s ability to bring
witnesses on his behalf. Defendants are permitted to file motions and
rebuttals for the presentation of additional evidence before the
Appeals Chamber:145
If the Appeals Chamber finds that the additional evidence was not available at trial and
is relevant and credible, it will determine if it could have been a decisive factor in reaching
the decision at trial. If it could have been such a factor, the Appeals Chamber will consider

141. Cogan, supra note 107, at 117–18.
142. See Luban, supra note 87, at 14 (discussing the import of due process to the legitimacy of
the international criminal tribunals).
143. See discussion supra Section I.A.3 and accompanying notes about Peter Erlinder
(discussing this possibility).
144. U.N. Secretariat, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, annex (1990).
145. IRMCT Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 82, Rules 142, 144(A) (“The Appeals
Chamber shall pronounce judgement on the basis of the record on appeal together with such
additional evidence as has been admitted by it.”).
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the additional evidence and any rebuttal material along with that already on
the record . . . .146

Witnesses would likely be deterred from appearing on an appellant’s
behalf if they knew they would face genocide denial charges as a result
of their testimony.
If the criminalization of denial of individual responsibility for
genocide is permitted during the appeals process, it is reasonable to
expect the same criminalization to apply in ongoing criminal trials for
those charged with genocide. The consequences of applying genocide
denial law to the extent that accused individuals could not safely assert
their innocence at trial would land a staggering blow to international
criminal justice. The right to the presumption of innocence, protected
by the leading human rights treaties,147 would become a mockery.148
International criminal trials would become a “damned if you do and
damned if you don’t” endeavor, reminiscent of the very show trials the
international criminal courts were created to avoid.149
B. Domestic Criminalization and States’ Duty to
“Accept and Carry Out”
Individual states should refrain from charging convicted persons
with genocide denial for maintaining their innocence on appeal. Such
infringement on a defendant’s fair trial rights would violate a state’s
duty to “accept and carry out” decisions of the Security Council.150 In
Security Council Resolution 1966, which established the IRMCT, the
Security Council bound states to “cooperate fully with the
Mechanism . . . [and to] take any measures necessary under their
domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and
the Statute of the Mechanism . . . .”151 The Statute of the Mechanism
146. Id. Rule 142(C).
147. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 14(2).
148. See Paul Behrens, Genocide Denial and the Law: A Critical Appraisal, 21 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 27, 39 (2015) (arguing that laws criminalizing genocide denial “would make a mockery
of the presumption of innocence”).
149. Aaron Fichtelberg, Fair Trials and International Courts: A Critical Evaluation of the
Nuremberg Legacy, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 5, 6–7 (2009).
150. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decision of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).
151. S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 4, ¶ 9 (observing best practices by using “decides” language in
the preamble to bind states to their duty to cooperate); see also id. annex 1, art. 28, ¶¶ 1–2:
States shall cooperate with the Mechanism in the investigation and prosecution of
persons covered by Article 1 of this Statute.
States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order
issued by a Single Judge or Trial Chamber in relation to cases involving persons covered
by Article 1 of this Statute, including, but not limited to:
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mandates that the Mechanism hear appeals on questions of law or
fact.152 The international criminal tribunals cannot function without
the cooperation of Member States, and “[r]ecalcitrance on behalf of
national authorities has a palpable effect on the efficiency of trials.”153
Therefore, one reading of states’ obligation to cooperate would require
states to ensure that domestic charging decisions do not impede the
Mechanism from operating its appeals process as ordained by the
Security Council.154 This reading is particularly persuasive when, as
here, such domestic charging decisions would infringe on the
fundamental due process provided by the Mechanism, which lends its
decisions international legitimacy.155 Although political sensitivities
may arise as a result of cooperation with the international tribunals,
such sensitivities do not constitute an excuse for failure to cooperate,
particularly when the integrity of the Mechanism’s administration of
justice is at stake.156
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the Mechanism;
U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7829th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc S/PV.7829 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“[The cooperation
requirement is] set under international law and should not be subject to domestic
law constraints.”).
152. S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 4, art. 23.
153. President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Letter dated
May 21, 2004 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 74, U.N.
Doc. S/2004/420 (May 24, 2004) (reprimanding Serbia and Montenegro for nonexistent cooperation
with the ICTY when they failed to turn over fugitives to the Tribunal, failed to provide access to
evidence, and failed to grant witnesses immunity to enable their testimony before the Tribunal).
Serbia was confronted in the Security Council meeting hall again in 2016 upon failing to turn over
individuals to the ICTY who were charged with contempt. See U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7829th mtg.
at 4–5, U.N. Doc S/PV.7829 (Dec. 8, 2016). Serbia claimed that it could not execute the ICTY’s
arrest warrants for individuals charged with contempt because Serbian domestic law provided
legal justification for such warrant execution only in response to indictments for atrocity crimes.
Id. at 27. This argument was heartily rejected by the other Security Council members, along with
Judge Agius of the ICTY and Judge Meron of the IRMCT. Id. at 4–6, 10.
154. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”). If the
Security Council passes a Chapter VII resolution pertaining to international peace and security
matters, that resolution is legally binding on UN Member States. Forsythe, supra note 66, at 841.
155. See discussion supra Section III.A. Denial of Individual Responsibility Should Not
Constitute Genocide Denial (noting that international tribunals like the Mechanism should aspire
to the highest levels of due process).
156. U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7829th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc S/PV.7829 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“Cooperation
is a vital responsibility flowing from the statute of the Tribunal itself, and reflects the collective
will of the Security Council in our common fight against impunity.”). Judge Agius noted during
the Security Council meeting that past cooperation cannot excuse noncompliance, nor release a
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C. Criminalization—an Effective Way to Combat Denial?
The threats to human rights posed by classifying denial of
individual responsibility as actionable genocide denial raise the broader
question of whether the criminalization of genocide denial is actually
the most effective or most efficient way to combat denial behaviors in
the first instance. Full analysis of this potential remains beyond the
scope of this Note. That said, criminal law may not be the best tool to
combat the problematic aspects of genocide denial. Genocide denial
trials could provide a forum for the dispersal of denial ideology, yet they
do not necessarily serve the goal of deterrence.
Two features of the criminal justice process suggest that
criminal law may not be the appropriate avenue for eradicating denial
behaviors. First, criminal law is exceptionally intrusive, and as such,
there should be a high threshold for criminalization of conduct—
specifically, requiring a finding that a certain level of harm was
proximately caused by the conduct and the perpetrator possessed a
certain level of intent.157 Denial laws presently exist with no intent
requirement as to any particular result, making it difficult to determine
if the high threshold for the criminalization of conduct is met.158 Second,
trials attract substantial publicity. Dissenting justices in the Holocaust
denial case R. v. Keegstra noted that criminal trials attract “extensive
media coverage and confer on the accused publicity for his dubious
causes, [and] may even bring him sympathy.”159 Public trials for
genocide denial present a forum for further dissemination of a
defendant’s ideology, which could ultimately be equally as harmful as
the original conduct being adjudicated. Such twisting of the
adjudicatory process not only serves the goals of denialism but makes a
mockery of the justice process.
Furthermore, the criminalization of genocide denial does not
seem to serve the goals of specific or general deterrence. For instance,
denier David Irving’s views did not change significantly following a
prison sentence for genocide denial.160 In fact, prison sentences for
member state from ongoing obligations to cooperate with the international criminal tribunals. Id.
at 5. Similarly, Mr. Yelchenko, representative for Ukraine, underlined that there is no permissible
justification for failing to cooperate with the international tribunals. Id. at 18.
157. See Behrens, supra note 148, at 33 (“[T]he exceptionally intrusive nature of criminal law
also demands that a particularly high threshold has to be imposed on conduct which is to fall
within its framework.”).
158. See discussion supra Part I (discussing genocide denial and international criminal
justice policy).
159. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 703 (Can.).
160. Mark Oliver, Irving Shows Little Remorse on Return to UK, GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2006,
10:32 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/dec/22/thefarright.austria [https://perma.cc/
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genocide denial may actually undercut the intended effect—in at least
some prisons, deniers stand to be exposed to extreme right-wing
propaganda that would serve only to affirm or strengthen their views,
such as statements made by fellow inmates claiming those in power
should not be prevented from wielding power as they choose.161
Extremist organizations tend to maintain contact with imprisoned
members to ensure the continuation of their ideological commitment.162
For indoctrinated extremists, conviction and prison may even seem like
a rite of passage or a step on the “career ladder.”163 Although denial
laws might serve the goal of general deterrence more effectively than
they do the goal of specific deterrence, it is difficult to determine the
success of criminalization, just as it is always difficult to determine the
success of general deterrence.164 There are many potential reasons
individuals refrain from denying genocide, including the presence of
overwhelming evidence that the genocide occurred.165 Furthermore, the
criminalization of denial might make it all the more enticing to both
individuals inclined to challenge authority and those that otherwise
would not engage in denial but for the lure of the deviant.166
Domestic convictions upheld due to an effective denial of the
fundamental right to appeal might satisfy the immediate policy
objectives of bringing accountability and reconciliation to war-torn
regions. The continued—and long-term—legitimacy of international
criminal justice efforts, however, is rooted in the understanding that
national reconciliation and long-term maintenance of peace depend on
true justice being rendered, as well as the widespread perception that
justice is being rendered.167 Practitioners of international criminal law
must be vigilant that the policies established and methods promulgated
to reduce genocide denial do not simultaneously infringe on a convicted
person’s fundamental right to an adequate and effective appeal.168
Rights of the accused must be protected by the courts, particularly
G7M2-UCWC] (describing Irving’s post-release statements that during his trial he was “obliged to
show remorse” but he “decided [he had] no need any longer to show remorse”).
161. Behrens, supra note 148, at 40.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 40–41 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 41.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Wayne Jordash and Scott Martin made a similar argument after identifying violations of
due process rights at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Wayne Jordash & Scott Martin, Due
Process and Fair Trial Rights at the Special Court: How the Desire for Accountability Outweighed
the Demands of Justice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 585, 608 (2010).
168. See supra Section III.A. Denial of Individual Responsibility Should Not
Constitute Genocide Denial (arguing that the right to appeal prohibits characterizing individual
denial of responsibility as genocide denial).
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because the backgrounds of international criminal defendants, the
severity of the crimes they are alleged to have committed, and the
concern for victims’ rights create a hostile atmosphere in which
fundamental due process rights of defendants are an unpopular topic.169
IV. INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO COMBATTING DENIAL WHILE
RETAINING THE SANCTITY OF DUE PROCESS
The adverse effects of genocide denial must be reduced while
maintaining full respect, both internationally and domestically, for the
fair trial rights of those accused or convicted of genocide. Therefore, any
potential holistic solution must address domestic and international
legal regimes, as well as reconciliatory practices.
A. Inclusion of Mens Rea Requirement in Domestic Statutes
The legal prohibitions of genocide denial should at minimum be
amended to include an explicit intent requirement that aligns with the
purposes of denial prohibition.170 At present, virtually none of the denial
laws passed in domestic jurisdictions contain a mens rea requirement
such as bad faith or hateful intent.171 This absence seems overly broad
when considered in the context of postconviction criminal appeals at the
international level. Notably, the UN Human Rights Committee has
criticized the lack of intent requirement in broad denial and
glorification laws,172 and the ECtHR has failed to uphold a conviction
for glorification of atrocity crimes due to lack of malicious intent.173
Intent determinations should require an analysis of whether a
reasonable person would have had the requisite intent as to a harmful

169. See, e.g., Cogan, supra note 107, at 112 (discussing reasons for the relative lack of interest
in protecting the rights of the accused).
170. See Hennebel & Hochmann, supra note 25, at xviii (discussing the current features of
domestic denial statutes). Robert Faurisson, who was convicted of denial in 1992, challenged the
legitimacy of the French denial law before the United Nations Human Rights Committee. His
claim was ultimately dismissed, likely because of the Committee’s concerns regarding the lack of
a mens rea requirement in the statute. See Martin Imbleau, Denial of the Holocaust, Genocide,
and Crimes Against Humanity: A Comparative Overview of Ad Hoc Statutes, in GENOCIDE DENIALS
AND THE LAW, supra note 25, at 235, 258.
171. Hochmann, supra note 43, at 317–18.
172. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (July 30, 2008).
173. See TEMPERMAN, supra note 69, at 307 (discussing the ECtHR’s handling of the case
Lehideaux and Isorni v. France); see also Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22 (“[T]hey
were not so much praising a policy as a man, and doing so for a purpose – namely securing revision
of Philippe Pétain’s conviction – whose pertinence and legitimacy at least, if not the means
employed to achieve it, were recognised by the Court of Appeals.”).

2021]

EVISCERATION OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL

251

result under the circumstances.174 If framed this way, an intent
requirement would almost categorically exclude denial of individual
responsibility on appeal from prosecution as genocide denial. In an
appellate chamber, the reasonable person’s intent behind denial of
responsibility is to achieve a more favorable legal outcome in his case.
A genuine assertion of innocence would therefore not meet the requisite
mens rea element and would not, on its own, inflict overt harm on
survivors of genocide or on the society. Survivors would suffer more
harm if there were no tribunal adjudicating atrocity crimes in which a
defendant could protest his innocence because there would be a delay
or denial of justice.
In amending denial statutes to include an intent requirement,
states should look to Switzerland’s prohibition of racial discrimination
as a guide.175 The Swiss criminal code condemns “any person who
publicly disseminates ideologies that have as their object the systematic
denigration or defamation of [members of a race, ethnic group, religion,
or sexual orientation].”176 This provision prohibits words, writings,
images, and gestures that have been introduced into a public forum and
intentionally undermine human dignity of a protected people group.177
By extension, the provision prohibits the denial, justification, or
minimization of atrocity crimes when committed with that same intent
to denigrate or defame.178 Alternatively, states could look to the 2003
Additional Protocol on the Convention on Cybercrime, which penalizes
denial “committed with the intent to incite hatred, discrimination or
violence.”179 Montenegro, Lithuania, and Ukraine have expressed that
they intend to implement this intent requirement.180 A genocide denial
statute including a mens rea requirement as recommended here could
take the following form:
Whoever publicly approves of, denies, challenges, or minimizes one or more genocide or
crime against humanity established under international law with the intent to incite
hatred, incite violence, or otherwise besmirch the dignity of the victims by approving of,

174. Hochmann, supra note 43, at 318.
175. SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311, art.
261bis (Switz.).
176. Id.
177. Imbleau, supra note 170, at 261.
178. Id.
179. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of
Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, art. 6(2), opened
for signature Jan. 1, 2003, C.E.T.S. No. 189 (entered into force Jan. 3, 2006).
180. Hochmann, supra note 43, at 319 n.158.
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glorifying, or justifying
criminal sanctions].181
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actions

taken

shall
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With the introduction of such statutory language, the chances of
charging denial of individual responsibility as genocide denial would be
significantly reduced. Some might argue that such statutory language
would interfere with prosecutions for genocide denial in other contexts,
but charging decisions regarding denial in most contexts would remain
largely undisturbed. Only in cases where an individual evinces no bad
faith or intent to disparage a victimized people group, glorify the actions
of genocidaires, or justify the actions that constitute genocide would
domestic prosecutions for genocide denial be affected.
B. Suggestions for Security Council Action
The Security Council must review the policies it may implicitly
communicate to the domestic governments of UN Member States, which
look to the Security Council for direction.182 The Security Council should
pass an independent resolution, or include language in a resolution
regarding the IRMCT, condemning genocide denial but reaffirming the
UN’s dedication to due process in the IRMCT. Because so much of
international law is normative, a Security Council resolution would
help align the competing priorities of justice for victims and due process
among the international community while also signaling to the
tribunals and domestic courts that due process must be respected.183
Ultimately, the Security Council has the authority to compel state

181. The model statutory language was influenced by the language of France’s genocide denial
prohibition, Germany’s genocide denial prohibition, and the 2003 Additional Protocol on the
Convention on Cybercrime. See Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la leberte de la presse [Law of July 29,
1881 on Freedom of the Press], COLLECTION COMPLÈTE, DÉCRETS, ORDONNANCES, RÈGLEMENTS ET
AVIS DU CONSEIL D’ÉTAT (DUVERGIER & BOCQUET) [DUV. & BOC.] [Complete Collection of Laws,
Decrees, Ordinances, Regulations and Opinions of the Council of State], July 29, 1881, art. 24bis
(Fr.) (one of the influences of the model statutory language); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [PENAL
CODE], § 130(3), https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/legislation/deu/german_criminal_code/special
_part_-_chapter_seven/section_130/section_130.html
[https://perma.cc/V2ED-UTZN]
(Ger.)
(same); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of
Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, art. 6(2), opened
for signature Jan. 1, 2003, C.E.T.S. No. 189 (entered into force Jan. 3, 2006) (same).
182. Role of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS: PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.
org/en/role-of-security-council (last visited Oct. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2VUA-QHL8].
183. See Ademola Abass, The Competence of the Security Council to Terminate the Jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 263, 296 (2005) (noting the significant power
of the Security Council and its importance to the cohesion of the international system).
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cooperation through a Chapter VII Resolution and could exercise that
authority in resolving this issue if deemed appropriate.184
C. Protective Measures for Defense Counsel
The international criminal tribunals must take affirmative
measures to safeguard the due process rights afforded to defendants by
protecting statements made by counsel for adjudicatory purposes, both
orally and in writing. Although a defense counselor’s statements that a
client did not commit genocide might create a public disturbance within
an affected population, defense counsel have a positive duty to do so if
the client desires to assert his innocence.185 Therefore, it is essential to
ensure that the fundamental rights of defendants—and by extension,
the rights of defense counsel—are preserved.186
The international tribunals should emulate the ICTR’s approach
to the charges levied against Peter Erlinder, whose case is discussed in
Part I. If defense counsel deny a defendant’s individual responsibility
for a genocide or other atrocity crime, they should be deemed to be
acting in their role as officers of the court and as such be deemed
immune from domestic prosecution. There is a line, however, between
statements made in service of a client and statements made for other,
potentially improper, purposes.187 If defense counsel publish statements
in the media that satisfy the elements of denial laws, amended as
suggested above, in a manner that has no benefit to their clients, they
may still be subject to prosecution.188
In most circumstances, public statements made by defense
counselors on behalf of their clients are motivated by an intent to
validate the interests of the client and would not meet the
recommended mens rea requirement of denial statutes.189 In an effort
to validate the competing set of interests in play, there could be a safe
184. Role of the Security Council, supra note 182.
185. Behrens, supra note 148, at 44.
186. Id.
187. This is a fine line with sweeping implications. If a defense counselor is found to have
violated genocide denial laws, she faces not only potential prosecution but sanctions from the
international criminal tribunals for failing to respect the laws and regulations of the countries in
which they enter to perform official duties on behalf of their clients. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note
4, art. 29 (International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals statute bestowing the duty
on defense counselors to “respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State”).
188. See Kramer, supra note 51, at 227 (noting that functional immunity for defense counsel
is not absolute).
189. See Jan Hoffman, May It Please the Public; Lawyers Exploit Media Attention as a Defense
Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/22/us/may-it-please-thepublic-lawyers-exploit-media-attention-as-a-defense-tactic.html
[https://perma.cc/RH28-X7FN]
(discussing motivations behind the increasing use of public statements by defense lawyers).
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harbor for defense counselors who provide a statement of intent at the
beginning of public remarks outlining the affirmative intent of their
statements and denouncing intent to cause the harms genocide denial
laws aim to address. Should charges be brought in a domestic
jurisdiction, such a statement could form a rebuttable presumption the
prosecuting authority must then combat with contradictory evidence.
This rebuttable presumption created by the mens rea requirement
would ultimately provide a layer of protection to defense counselors
while also supporting the due process right defendants have to test facts
in open court.
D. Protective Measures for Witnesses
As a final and ancillary observation, international tribunals
offer numerous protections to witnesses, chief among them being
anonymity.190 If witnesses face potential genocide denial charges in a
domestic forum for the testimony they desire to give on behalf of
international criminal defendants, their testimony should be heard in
closed session and their identities should never be revealed to the
general public.191 Additionally, judicial opinions, motions, and other
documents should be redacted to protect witness identities before being
released to the public.192 These measures protect witnesses in two ways.
The first is obvious—it maintains witness anonymity in a manner that
would protect them from denial charges. The second is more subtle.
Denial laws combat public speech that has the potential to cause harm
or incite violence, and trials cause concern only because the content of
the proceedings is available to the public. If, however, a witness’s
statements were heard in closed session and were never included in the
documents released to the public, they would not be considered public

190. See IRMCT Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 82, Rule 86 (detailing the
various measures an appeals chamber may utilize to preserve the privacy and protection of
witnesses, including measures to protect the identity of a witness, holding closed sessions, and
hearing testimony via one-way CCTV).
191. See id. Rule 93 (“A Judge or Trial Chamber may order that the press and the public be
excluded from all or part of the proceedings for reasons of . . . safety, security, or non-disclosure of
the identity of a victim or witness as provided in Rule 86 . . . .”); see also id. Rule 86 (discussing
measures for the protection of victims and witnesses).
192. See id. Rule 86(B)(i):
[The Mechanism may decide whether to order]: (i) measures to prevent disclosure to the
public or the media of the identity or whereabouts of a victim or a witness, or of persons
related to or associated with a victim or witness by such means as: (a) expunging names
and identifying information from the Mechanism’s public records; (b) non-disclosure to
the public of any records identifying the victim or witness; (c) giving of testimony
through image- or voice- altering devices or closed circuit television; and (d) assignment
of a pseudonym . . . .
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statements. Therefore, prosecuting a witness for a statement denying
individual responsibility of a defendant would no longer serve the
purposes of the denial laws and would be a waste of domestic resources.
E. Interdisciplinary Suggestions for Combatting
Genocide Denial Holistically
Appropriately addressing the persistent problem of genocide
denial requires an interdisciplinary approach. The primary objective of
nonlegal measures must be countering denial behaviors in an effort to
protect truth and the dignity of survivors. First and foremost, states
should devote significant resources to education efforts.193 There is
power in survivors’ stories.194 Measures should also be taken to confront
low-level deniers in a way that leads to the development of empathy for
those harmed by denial and prevents the further development of farright ideology. The German program “Für die Zukunft Lernen”
(Learning for the Future), led by Werner Nickolai,195 has had some
success at doing just that.196 In an attempt to combat denial behaviors
in young people, Nickolai leads a group of individuals who align with
the extreme right on a ten-day journey to Auschwitz-Birkenau where
the group listens to Holocaust survivors tell their stories.197 After
survivors of the concentration camps explain their experiences,
Nickolai’s pupils generally do not continue to subscribe to genocide
denial ideology.198 This method stands to reduce denial behaviors
among young right wing subscribers to denial ideology, but admittedly,
it is unlikely to have the same effect on political leaders who have a very
different set of incentives for denying atrocity crimes. It remains a
useful preventative measure, however. Building empathy where there

193. Devoting attention and resources to education efforts aligns with the policy of the IRMCT
and its Office of the Prosecutor. See President of the IRMCT, Letter dated Nov. 19, 2018 from the
President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the
President of the Security Council, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. S/2018/1033, annex II (Nov. 19, 2018) (“The
Office of the Prosecutor firmly rejects genocide denial and is committed to promoting education
and remembrance as key tools in the fight against genocide ideology.”).
194. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Summary of the High-Level Panel
Discussion Dedicated to the Sixty-Fifth Anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/24 (June 30, 2014) (“Survivors
could play an important role in preserving memories and truth, which would contribute to
countering genocide denial.”).
195. LEARN FOR FUTURE, https://www.fuer-die-zukunft-lernen.de/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/W3HL-5H23].
196. Behrens, supra note 148, at 49.
197. Id. at 48–49.
198. Id. at 49.

256

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:221

previously was none would go a long way in solving the broader problem
of denial.199
CONCLUSION
Genocide denial is a harmful phenomenon that should be
addressed under domestic law. 200 It must be done in a manner, however,
that does not threaten the due process rights of defendants in
international criminal tribunals. Mooting the established due process
rights of criminal defendants at the international and hybridized level
would destroy the legitimacy and respect of such criminal tribunals.201
Like all judicial bodies, the trial chambers of the international criminal
tribunals often commit errors of fact and law, making the right to
appeal an essential review mechanism for all convicted persons.202
Convicted persons have the right to an appeal, along with a slate of fair
trial rights that apply during that appeal, which would be threatened if
the mere exercise of appeal satisfied the elements of a crime in a
domestic forum.203 On appeal, defendants may be represented by an
attorney and have the opportunity to bring witnesses, but attorneys and
witnesses would likely be unwilling to cooperate if they faced
prosecution for denial.204 Ultimately, the effect of such interaction
between domestic and international criminal law would result in an
impermissible chilling of appeals in the international criminal
tribunals. Such a chilling effect would render fair trial rights a mockery,
as trials would go unreviewed, and would damage the legitimacy of the
international criminal tribunals.
Measures should be taken, at both the domestic and
international levels, to constrain the range of behavior actionable as
denial in order to protect the right to an effective and adequate appeal.
First, the language of denial statutes should be amended to include a

199. Elliott Davis, Empathy in the Face of Tragedy, DUKE CHRON. (Apr. 21, 2019, 11:00 PM),
https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2019/04/duke-university-empathy-in-the-face-of-tragedy
[https://perma.cc/AW4W-RV75].
200. See discussion supra Section I.A (examining genocide denial and the laws addressing it).
201. See Luban, supra note 87, at 14 (highlighting the importance of full due process to the
legitimacy of the international criminal tribunals).
202. 8 March 2018 – News About the Courts – Bemba et al Appeals Judgment on Convictions
and Sentences, and ICC AC Confirms Katanga and Al-Mahdi Reparations Orders, ICL MEDIA REV.
(Mar. 9, 2018, 3:43 PM), http://www.iclmediareview.com/8-march-2018-news-courts-bemba-et-alappeals-judgment-convictions-sentences-icc-ac-confirms-katanga-al-mahdi-reparations-orders
[https://perma.cc/SBM5-9XTE].
203. See supra Part II; Section III.A (arguing that denial of responsibility is protected by the
right to appeal).
204. ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 14(3)(d)-(e).
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specific intent requirement.205 Second, the Security Council should
meet to discuss balancing the pertinent competing interests and pass a
resolution requiring states to respect the agreed upon balance.206 Third,
the international criminal tribunals should take measures to protect
defense counselors and witnesses from prosecution when they act in
furtherance of adjudication.207 Finally, nonlegal practices should be
implemented at the domestic level to shatter denial ideologies early,
before they have the chance to create the harmful effects of unchecked
denial.208 Justice is best served when domestic and international legal
regimes work in harmony.209 The measures recommended here would
preserve the delicate balance between the two regimes while serving
the ends of creating justice for victims, promoting regional
reconciliation, and safeguarding the due process rights of defendants.
Jennifer E. King*
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